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There is growing evidence in the finance literature that media coverage can influence 
security pricing by facilitating news dissemination and reducing informational frictions 
even if it does not provide new information. This study examines the role of media 
coverage in the well-known foreign share discount puzzle in China. We show that 
differential level of news coverage for the same firm by Chinese and English media is 
significantly associated with the foreign share discount. Specifically, the discount is 
greater among firms with relatively more Chinese than English press coverage. We also 
find this effect more pronounced among firms with less analyst following and less 
institutional ownership. This implies that media coverage compensates for limitations in 
analyst coverage and is more influential among less sophisticated investors. Our evidence 
is robust to controls of other determinants of Chinese foreign share discount documented 
by previous literature. Despite of the widespread belief that the Chinese media is tightly 
controlled, our study reveals that it still plays an influential role in the capital market. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is increasing empirical evidence in the finance literature that media coverage serves as 
information intermediary in the capital market and therefore affects security pricing (e.g. Fan 
and Peress, 2009; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008). To the extent that the media facilitates 
financial information dissemination to the wider public by reducing the informational costs and 
providing credibility (Dyck and Zingales, 2003), these findings confirms that media contributes 
to the corporate information environment available to investors. However, these researches are 
carried out in developed countries such as the US where the media is more independent and 
competitive. Thus, evidence from these studies may not necessarily apply to emerging 
countries such as China where the media are assumed to be under tighter control. Thus, to what 
extend media coverage can influence security pricing in the capital market of emerging 
countries is an interesting and open question. 
To answer this question, we exploit the well-documented foreign share discount puzzle of 
China. Unlike segmented stock market of other countries, the foreign B-shares issued by 
Chinese firms are largely traded at a discount instead of premium relative to local A-shares 
issued by the same firm despite of identical cash flow and voting rights (Bailey et al., 1999). 
Since A- and B-shares depend on the same stream of future cash flows, the price differentials 
between these shares reflects that local and foreign investors perceives the risk of the same firm 
differently. Existing literature put forward many explanations to this phenomenon, including 
market liquidity (Chen et al., 2001), information asymmetry (Chan et al., 2008), investor 
speculation (Mei et al., 2009), accounting disclosure (Tan, 2011), corporate governance (Tong 
and Yu, 2012), and state ownership (Hou and Lee, 2012). We offer new insight to this literature 
by examining the effect of media coverage. 
According to the “investor recognition hypothesis” of Merton (1987), investors are not 
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aware of all securities in an informationally incomplete market. As a result, stocks of firms with 
lower investor recognition have greater information uncertainty and rational investors would 
attach to such stocks a higher level of discount rate. By providing information dissemination 
and credibility to wider audience, media coverage increases investor recognition of firms and 
reduces information uncertainty, which contributes to the reduction of firms’ discount rate. 
Foreign share discount is implied from the price difference between A-shares and B-shares 
issued by the same firm. If media coverage contributes to foreign share discount in China, then 
we expect the discount to be greater among firms with relatively more local than foreign media 
coverage. This is because greater local media coverage could lead local investors to attach 
lower discount rate to A-shares and less foreign coverage could lead foreign investors to attach 
a higher discount rate to B-shares.  
If the effect of media coverage on foreign share discount in China is indeed due to its 
capability to reach a wider public by reducing information cost and providing credibility, then 
we expect its effect to be more pronounced among firms with less sell-side financial analyst 
following and firms with less institutional ownership. When compared to media journalists, 
financial analysts are have more expertise and knowledge of the firms they follow. Thus, 
analyst reports are likely to be more informative and therefore supersede media reports in terms 
of credibility and influence to investors. Thus, media coverage is expected to be less influential 
on investors among firms where financial analyst researches are more available. When 
compared to individual investors, institutional investors such as mutual fund are more 
sophisticated and often have their own buy-side analysts to study the firms they invest. Thus, 
the investment decisions of institutional investors are less likely to be influenced by media 
coverage than individual investors. 
To test these assertions, we sample A- and B-share dual-listed Chinese firms in both the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the period from 2004 to 2008. For each firm, we 
 2 
count the monthly number of news that appears in influential business press. We select four 
most established Chinese language business newspapers published in mainland China. This 
captures the level of media coverage targeting local public, which makes up most of the 
investors for the A-shares. We select another four most influential English language business 
newspapers both published in China and abroad (including Wall Street Journal of US and 
Financial Times of UK). This captures the level of media coverage targeting foreigners, which 
makes up most of the investors for B-shares. We use the ratio of Chinese to English language 
news for each firm on a monthly basis as a proxy for the disparity in media coverage available 
to local and foreign investors. 
Our main findings are as follows. First, among firms with relatively more Chinese language 
relative to English language news, we observe significantly greater level of foreign share 
discount. This is consistent with more media coverage in Chinese language reducing the 
discount rate of the domestic A-shares and less media coverage in English language increasing 
the discount rate of foreign B-shares. Second, the association between media coverage and 
foreign share discount is more pronounced among firms with less analyst coverage. This is 
consistent with investor decision being more reliant on media coverage when financial analyst 
researches are less available. Third, this association between media and foreign share discount 
is also more pronounced among firms with less institutional ownership. This is consistent with 
the decision of less sophisticated individual investors being more dependent on media 
coverage. These findings are robust to controls by other determinant of foreign share discount 
in China, firm characteristics that influence discount rates, as well as industry, year, and 
regional effects. 
These findings distinguish our study from the few existing studies of media influence on 
asset pricing in China. A concurrent study by Gong and Gul (2011) examines influence of local 
media on Chinese domestic stock market but did not address the issue of foreign share discount. 
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Since the Chinese foreign share discount is considered a “puzzle” by existing literature, our 
study applies a more unique research setting offered by China. An earlier study by Chakravarty 
et al (1998) did examine whether foreign share discount in China is influenced by media, but 
considers only the influence of foreign media and not the local media. Since foreign share 
discount is derived from the relative price between foreign and local shares, the complete set of 
media influence would incorporate the effect of both foreign and local media, which our study 
considers.  
Our findings contribute to two strands of the academic literature. In relation to the growing 
literature on economic development in China, we show that the media coverage contributes to 
the corporate information environment despite of the widely held view that the Chinese media 
might be less informative due to tight control. Our evidence shows that media coverage is 
especially important to reduce the information disadvantage of unsophisticated individual 
investors, which in turn promotes greater degree of fairness across investor groups. To the 
established literature on Chinese foreign share discount puzzle, we provide evidence that media 
coverage plays a role above and beyond determinants identified by previous studies. We show 
that the foreign share discount influenced by media coverage through investment decisions of 
unsophisticated individual investors.  
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the literature and develops our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research design and sample. Section 4 describes our 
empirical findings. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature and hypotheses 
2.1 Influence of media on security pricing 
There is increasing interest and empirical evidence in the finance literature on the influence 
of media on security pricing. Klibanoff et al. (1998) show that country-specific news coverage 
affects the pricing of closed-end country funds. Dyck and Zingales (2003) show that stock 
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prices are more reactive to the type of earnings emphasized by the media and this effect is more 
pronounced when firms have less analyst coverage or when the media outlet is more credible. 
Chan (2003) shows that headline news of firms influences stock return momentum and reversal 
patterns. Meschke (2004) show increase in stock value and reversal after CEO interviews on 
CNBC. Tetlock (2007) show that pessimism in media reports predicts downward pressure in 
stock price and Tetlock et al. (2008) further document that the amount of negative words in 
news stories also predicts earnings performance. Bushee et al. (2008) show larger stock price 
and trading volume reaction to earnings announcement among firms with more media 
coverage. Fang and Peress (2009) show firms with less media coverage earn higher stock 
returns and that this effect is more pronounced among firms with low analyst following and low 
institutional investors. 
The “investor recognition hypothesis” of Merton (1987) stipulates that in an informationally 
incomplete market, investors prefer stocks of firms with more information available. Yohn 
(1998) show smaller bid-ask spread around earnings announcement for firm with greater 
analyst following. Grullon et al. (2004) show that advertising expenditures increase the 
liquidity of stocks. Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2005) document that investors prefer stocks 
from firms with brand recognition. In addition to these alternative ways in which firms can gain 
investor recognition, the media facilitates information dissemination, reduces information cost, 
and provides credibility to a wider public. Indeed, Barber and Odean (2008) show that 
individual investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks.  
The perception from western developed countries is that media is under tight control and 
political influence in China (e.g. Besley and Prat, 2006; Esarey, 2006). Thus, to what extent 
media coverage influence security pricing in China is an interesting and open question. Gong 
and Gul (2011) show mixed evidence on the benefit of media coverage on Chinese stock 
market. On the one hand, they provide evidence that firms under greater media coverage have 
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lower stock returns and more active trading, which is consistent with media coverage exerting 
positive influence through the reduction of discount rate and increase of liquidity. On the other 
hand, they show greater bid-ask spread and analyst forecast dispersion among firms with more 
media coverage, which suggest that media cause more divergence in opinions among investors. 
To gain further insight into the role of media in security pricing of Chinese capital market, our 
study applies the interesting and well-known foreign share discount puzzle in China as the 
research setting. 
2.2 The Chinese stock market and the foreign share discount puzzle 
To encourage external capital acquisition and promote economic development, China 
established stock exchanges separately in the Shanghai and Shenzhen since the early 1990s. By 
2001, the market capitalization of China’s stock market was already the largest among 
developing countries. Currently, China has the second largest stock market in the world, only 
the US being larger.1. Majority of Chinese listed firms only issue A-shares denominated in the 
Chinese currency RMB and are traded in Shanghai or Shenzhen exchanges. Domestic investors 
largely dominate the A-share market despite some qualified foreign institutional investors 
(QFII) being allowed access since 2003. By the end of 2009, 1,632 Chinese listed firms are 
listed in the exchanges with pure A-shares. Some Chinese firms also issue B-shares 
denominated in US dollars if traded in Shanghai exchange or in Hong Kong dollars if traded in 
Shenzhen exchange. Foreign investors largely dominate the B-share market although domestic 
investors were allowed trade such shares since 2001. However, domestic investors’ 
participation in B-share market is largely hampered by limits of their access to foreign 
currencies (Tan, 2011). By the end of 2009, 86 Chinese listed firms issue both A-shares and 
B-shares. To accommodate foreign investors’ need for financial statement information, these 
dual-listed firms had always been required to provide additional accounting information under 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on top of their main financial reporting 
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based on the Chinese domestic accounting standards.  
Bailey et al (1999) examined the segmented stock market of 11 countries. Across majority of 
these countries, i.e. Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Thailand, foreign shares issued by the same firm are 
traded at a premium than domestic shares. China is the only country where foreign shares are 
traded at a discount relative to domestic shares and this inconsistency relative to other emerging 
countries came to be known in the literature as a puzzle. The argument that foreign investors are 
better able to diversify their risk and therefore have lower expected returns than domestic 
investors seems to apply to most countries except China. The argument that informational 
disadvantages (e.g., Brennan and Cao, 1997; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001) of foreign 
investors cause them to have higher expected returns than domestic investors seems to apply to 
China but not other countries. Fernald and Rogers (2002) suggest that Chinese investors have 
lower expected returns due to the lack of alternative investment channels. However, although 
the foreign investor information disadvantage and the domestic investment channel explanation 
can explain why B-shares would be traded at a discount relative to A-shares, they do not 
address cross-sectional variations in this discount across firms.  
Existing literature generally suggest three sets of determinants of cross-sectional variations 
in Chinese foreign share discount, i.e. market liquidity, corporate governance, and information 
asymmetry. In terms of market liquidity, existing studies show that trading volume differential 
between A- and B-share (Chen et al., 2001) and the speculative component of A-share price 
(Mei et al., 2009) correlates with Chinese foreign share discount. In terms of corporate 
governance, empirical evidence shows that foreign share discount is higher among firms with 
less independent board (Tong and Yu, 2011) or when the conflict of interest between dominant 
and minority shareholders is higher (Hou and Lee, 2012). In terms of information asymmetry, 
Chinese foreign share discount is shown to be correlated with the probability of informed 
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trading (PIN) measure (Chan et al., 2008), the disparity in accounting disclosure (Tan, 2011) 
and firm citations in Wall Street Journal headline by Chakravarty et al. (1998).  
Although Chakravarty et al (1998) documented the influence of media coverage on foreign 
discount of China, they only provide limited analysis and apply an early and short sample 
period of 1994 to 1996. Furthermore, they only consider influence of foreign media published 
in English language and do not account for the possible role of local media published in 
Chinese language. Finally, their evidence assumes media effect to be unconditional and not 
affected by cross-sectional variations in corporate information environment or type of 
investors. As recent finance literature pay increasing attention to effect of media on security 
pricing, we believe the Chinese foreign share discount provides a useful setting and the role of 
media in this phenomenon deserves more thorough and rigorous study. We fill this literature 
gap. 
2.3 Hypothesis development 
To generate our research hypotheses, we intersect the two aforementioned strands of 
literature, i.e. the influence of media on security pricing and the Chinese foreign share discount 
phenomenon. Media coverage facilitates information dissemination, reduces information costs, 
and provides information credibility to the wider public (e.g. Dyck and Zingales, 2003). In a 
market with incomplete information, investors prefer stocks from firms with more information 
available (e.g. Merton, 1987). Investors are expected to have greater preference and recognition 
for firms with more media coverage. Investors are better able to anticipate future performance 
of such firms due to lower information risk. Thus, based on the positive relation between 
information risk and investors’ required returns established in the literature (e.g. Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O’Hara, 2004), investors are also expected attach a lower 
discount rate to firms with greater media coverage. Chinese dual-listed firms issue A-shares 
mostly traded by local investors and B-shares mostly traded by foreign investors. Most such 
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firms have A-share traded at a higher value than B-shares, and this pricing difference (i.e. 
A-price minus B-price) implies the foreign share discount. Chinese language media coverage 
can be assumed to be more influential to the local investors and English language media 
coverage can be assumed to affect investment decisions of foreign investors more. Among 
dual-listed firms with relatively more coverage in Chinese language media than English 
language media, the discount rate of A-shares is expected to be relatively lower than that of 
B-shares. This leads to our testable hypothesis: 
H1: Firms with relatively higher ratio of Chinese language to English language media 
coverage are associated with higher foreign share discount. 
There are two critiques against our assumption above. First, perhaps due to English being an 
international language, the local investors also get influenced by English language media 
coverage. If so, the A-share discount rate may also decrease as English language media 
coverage increase. Second, perhaps due to the assumption that local information sources are 
quicker and more accurate, foreign investors may seek to access Chinese language media 
coverage through translation service. If so, the B-share discount rate may also decrease as 
Chinese language media coverage increase. However, these two possible factors would 
potentially bias against us finding evidence in support of hypothesis H1. As further test, the 
effects of Chinese and English media coverage on foreign share discount are compared. If 
Chinese language media coverage is indeed more influential to A-share investors than B-share 
investors, then it should be positively related instead of negatively to foreign share discount. If 
English language media is indeed more influential to B-share investors than A-share investors, 
then it should be negatively related to foreign share discount.  
An interesting and related issue is whether the Chinese or English media coverage effect 
plays greater role in foreign share discount. On the one hand, prestigious English language 
business press published abroad such as Wall Street Journal and Financial Times can assumed 
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to be more independent and therefore more authoritative than Chinese language business press 
published domestically. Based on this argument, English language press and especially those 
published abroad should play a greater role in influencing foreign share discount. Indeed, 
Chakravarty et al. (1998) confirms the effect of Wall Street Journal coverage on Chinese 
foreign share discount but did not horse-race this against Chinese language media coverage. On 
the other hand, there are also reasons to believe that Chinese language business press may be 
more influential on foreign share discount. First, foreign investors have more expertise (e.g. 
Froot and Ramadorai, 2007) and access to more sophisticated information channels (e.g. 
sell-side analyst for individual investors or buy-side analysts for institutional investors). As a 
result, they depend less on media coverage than the local investors in China. In other words, 
even if foreign business press is more authoritative, their influence on Chinese foreign share 
discount may be limited because foreign investors rely on them less. Second, despite the widely 
held view from western developed countries that Chinese media is tightly controlled and less 
independent, it is still possible that Chinese media journalists have more local knowledge and 
provide richer information relative to their foreign counterparts on business related issues that 
are not politically sensitive. Existing studies (e.g. Bae et al., 2008) document that local analyst 
outperform foreign analysts in forecast accuracy. Given these arguments, we hypothesize that: 
H2: Foreign share discount is associated more with Chinese language media coverage than 
English language media coverage. 
The argument above that access to more sophisticated information channel reduces foreign 
investors reliance on media coverage also applies to local investors. Thus, among firms where 
sell-side analyst researches reports are more available, even local investors may have less 
dependence on media coverage. The influence of media coverage on security pricing is also 
expected to vary across investor groups. Institutional investors have more expertise and often 
have their own buy-side analyst to evaluate firms. Such investors are less reliant on media when 
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compared to individual investors. Thus, among firms with more institutional investors, the 
influence of media is also reduced. Given these arguments, we further hypothesize that: 
H3: Evidence in support of Hypotheses H1 and H2 are more pronounced among firms with 
less analyst following. 
H4: Evidence in support of Hypotheses H1 and H2 are more pronounced among firms with 
less institutional fund ownership. 
 There are potential critiques against some of our hypotheses due to the possible 
differences in the characteristics of Chinese and English media. First, Chinese news may be 
more positive than English news. However, the reluctance to disseminate negative news by 
Chinese media will only reduce their informativeness to investors relative to English news. In 
this case, the effect of Chinese media on stock price should be lower than that of the effect of 
English media.  In other words, the empirical results are more likely to bias against, instead of 
in favor of, our hypotheses. Second, the release of English news may lag that of Chinese news, 
which makes the former largely reconfirming the information of the latter. However, we are not 
looking at the impact of news content per se on stock prices like an event study setting. In that 
case, earlier released news will incur more share price response than later released news on the 
same information. Instead, we are looking at the impact of media coverage on stock prices, 
which is based on well established literature (Merton, 1987; Fang and Peress, 2009). The 
intuition is that more media coverage strengthens information environment of a firm and 
reduces investors information cost, which in turn affects the discount rate they attach to the 
firm. If media coverage per se has no affect on share prices, then this would affect both Chinese 
and English media coverage. In words, the empirical results are again more likely to bias 
against, instead of in favor of, our hypotheses. 
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3. Sample and methodology 
3.1 Test of hypotheses 
To test our predictions in Hypotheses H1 and H2 we use regression analyses based on 
Equations 1 and 2 respectively:  
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(2) 
The dependent variable FSDi,t is the foreign share discount of firm i at the end of month t, 
calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. Based on 
this construction, a higher FSDi,t value indicates a greater foreign share discount. We use two 
key variables to test our hypotheses. RNEWSi,t of Equation 1 is the natural logarithm of the 
number of Chinese language news reports divided by the number of English language news 
reports for firm i during month t.2 Higher value of RNEWSi,t indicates relatively greater media 
coverage available to local investors relative to foreign investors for the same firm. CNEWSi,t 
and ENEWSi,t of Equation 2 are the natural logarithm of number of Chinese language news 
reports and the number of English news reports respectively. To measure Chinese language 
media coverage, we select four influential Chinese newspapers published in mainland China. 
This includes Yangzi Evening Post (Yangzi Wanbao), First Financial Daily (Diyi Caijing 
Ribao 3 ), China Securities Journal (Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao), and Securities Times 
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(Zhengquan Shibao). To measure English language media coverage, we select four influential 
newspapers that are published abroad (i.e. Wall Street Journal and Financial Times), in Hong 
Kong (i.e. South China Morning Post), and on mainland China (i.e. China Daily). We search by 
the name of each dual-listed firm that we sample and count the number of reports about the firm 
in these newspapers. If the coefficient 1 in Equation 1 is significantly positive, this will 
indicate that the same dual-listed firms with relatively more Chinese than English language 
news counts over the same period are associated with relatively higher A-share than B-share 
value. This will support the prediction of Hypothesis H1 that firms with higher foreign share 
discount are associated with relatively more Chinese language than English media coverage. If 
coefficient 1 is significantly positive and coefficient 2 is insignificant in Equation 2, this will 
indicate that the association between foreign share discount and media coverage is dominated 
by Chinese news reports instead of English news report. This provides evidence in support of 
the prediction in Hypothesis H2.  
In our regression analysis we include four sets of control variables. The first set addresses 
the ownership influence (Hou and Lee, 2012), information asymmetry (e.g., Chan et al., 2008), 
market liquidity (Chen et al., 2001), and investor speculation (Mei et al., 2009) explanations put 
forward in the literature to address the Chinese foreign share discount. SOEi,t-1 is 1 for 
state-controlled firms and 0 otherwise. REFORMi,t-1 is 1 from the years in which the firm begins 
the process of the Split Share Structure Reform and all years afterward, and 0 for the years 
before this.4 The conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and outside minority 
shareholders is assumed to be higher among state-controlled firms and prior to the reform. 
RMVi,t-1 is the ratio of the market capitalization of A-shares to B-shares at the end of the 
previous month. Assuming firm size is inversely related with information asymmetry, firms 
with a lower B-share than A-share market capitalization can be assumed to have greater 
information asymmetry between foreign than local investors. RTOi,t-1 is the ratio of the turnover 
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of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. Firms with higher turnover are assumed to 
be more liquid. RRETi,t-1 is the ratio of the stock returns of A- to B-shares in the last month. 
Higher past returns is expected to increase the likeliness of speculation. This particular variable 
further addresses the relative price movement between A- and B-shares of the same firm. 
We incorporate determinants of cost of equity capital in our second set of control variables. 
LEVi,t-1 is the debt-to-equity ratio of the last fiscal year, which measures financial distress. 
SALEi,t-1 is the percentage change in sales growth in the last fiscal year, which captures 
demand-side growth. IROAi,t-1 is the industry median-adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal 
year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets, and this measure captures firms’ 
profitability. TQi,t-1 is the Tobin’s Q in the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value 
and debt, divided by total equity, and this measure proxies for firm performance. BETAi,t-1 
captures firms’ exposure to systematic risk and it is measured as CAPM beta up to the end of the 
last year, estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily 
market excess returns over the past one-year period. PIi,t-1 is the percentage change in residual 
variance or share price informativeness over the last year, which serves as a proxy for changes 
in the firm-specific information environment. This measure is estimated as the log of [(1–
R2)/R2] where R2 is the goodness-of-fit measure based on a time-series regression of 
firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess 
returns, following Fernandes and Ferreira (2008).5 These control variables either requires data 
available from the financial statements (e.g., leverage, sales, profitability, and Tobin’s Q) or 
estimation through past historical return data (e.g., beta and price informativeness). Therefore, 
they are updated on an annual frequency, based on the previous fiscal year-end values. 
Corporate governance qualities make up the third set of control. Governance not only affects 
the cost of equity capital (e.g., Lombardo and Pagano, 2002) but also has been documented to 
explain the Chinese foreign share discount (Tong and Yu, 2011). OWNCi,t-1 is the ownership 
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concentration of the last fiscal year, measured by the Herfindahl index based on the ownership 
held by the ten largest shareholders of the firm. CHOLDi,t-1 is equal to 1 for firms with CEO 
shareholdings above top 75th or below bottom 25th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 
otherwise. Higher CEO ownership induces entrenchment and lower CEO ownership reduces 
the incentive alignment with the shareholders. Both effects increase the potential of agency 
problem. CDUALi,t-1 is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as board chairman in the last fiscal 
year, and 0 otherwise. The board has less power to monitor CEOs that also serve as the 
chairman. BINDPi,t-1 is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal 
year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. Managers are better monitored by 
independent shareholders who are assumed to have a greater incentive and expertise. 
BMEETi,t-1 is 1 for firms with number of board meetings in the last fiscal year above the 
cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. More active monitoring is assumed for boards that 
meet up more frequently. BSIZEi,t-1 is 1 for firms with board size in the last fiscal year above the 
cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. These governance control variables are also updated 
annually, and based on the previous fiscal year-end values. 
As the fourth set of control, we also include three sets of dummy variables that control for 
industry (Industry), year (Year), and regional (Area) fixed effects, respectively. We define 
industry according to the first two digits of the GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) 
code. Following Firth et al (2006) we define region based four different regions based on 
economic development level.   
To test Hypotheses H3 and H4, we first split our samples by number of analyst following and 
the percentage of institutional ownership, and then carry out regression analyses of Equations 1 
and 2. If 1 > 0 in Equation 1 and 1 > 0 while 2 = 0 in Equation 2 only in low analyst following 
and low institutional ownership firms, then we have evidence in support of Hypothesis H3 and 
H4 respectively. 
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3.2 Sample description, summary statistics, and correlation matrix 
The sample period of our analyses covers 2004 to 2008.6 The Chinese Security Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) and China Center of Economic Research (CCER) databases 
provides the data used to compute variables such as the foreign share discount, state control 
status, the proportion of restricted shares, the firm-specific year of reform, market 
capitalization, turnover, stock returns, debt-to-equity ratio, the return on assets ratio, Tobin’s Q, 
share price informativeness, ownership concentration, CEO ownership, CEO duality, the 
number of outside directors, the number of board meetings, board size, and industrial and 
regional classifications. Datastream provides Chinese domestic market returns and the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) provides US stock market returns. The Chinese 
language media coverage is collected from China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI).7 
The English language media coverage is collected from Factiva. We deal with outliers by 
winsorizing the top and bottom 1% of all our regression variables, except those that are 
constructed as dummy variables. We include listed firms that issue both A- and B-shares in both 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Finally, our sample requires all of the 
aforementioned variables to have valid values and includes a total of 4,218 firm-month 
observations. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analyses. Over our 
sample period, the average monthly B-share discount (FSD) is 43.66%. The natural logarithm 
of average monthly ratio of Chinese to English language media coverage (RNEWS) is 1.2674, 
which suggests that on the average the dual-listed firms we sample have more news reported in 
Chinese than English language media. The average ratio of the monthly turnover (RTO) 
between A- and B-shares of the same firms is 1.1027. Since RTO > 1, this confirms that the 
B-share market is relatively less liquid than A-share market. In terms of correlation matrix, 
Table 2 suggests that FSD is negatively correlated with RNEWS, which is surprising given our 
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prediction in Hypothesis H1. However, the correlation analysis does not control for the 
confounding effect of other variables that could influence foreign share discount and correlate 
with our media coverage variable. The FSD is positively correlated with SOE and negatively 
correlated with REFORM, which is consistent with Hou and Lee (2012) and suggests greater 
foreign share discount when conflict of interest between controlling shareholder and outside 
investors is higher. RTO is positively correlated with FSD, which is consistent with Chen et al 
(2001) and indicates a higher foreign share discount for dual-listers when the B-share stocks are 
less liquid. The FSD is positively related to leverage (LEV) and negatively related to 
profitability (IROA), which suggests that foreign share discount is higher for firms with more 
financial risk and lower for firms that are more profitable. The FSD is negatively related with 
board independence (BINDP) and board size (BSIZE), which suggests that better monitoring 
reduces foreign share discount. 
[insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1 Tests of H1 and H2 
 Table 3 presents regression analyses to test Hypothesis H1, which predicts that foreign 
share discount is positively associated with the ratio of Chinese to English language media 
coverage. Regression 1 shows that under the control of industry, year, region, and firm fixed 
effect, the coefficient of RNEWS is significantly positive (0.0026, t-statistics = 3.22). In 
Regressions 2 and 3, we incorporate other control variables including the determinants of 
foreign share discounts, firms characteristics that affect cost of capital, and corporate 
governance characteristics. In Regression 3 where the full Equation 1 is implemented, the 
coefficient of RNEWS also significantly positive (0.0019, t-statistics = 2.56). This confirms that 
our evidence in support of the prediction of Hypothesis H1 is not due to potential confounding 
effects captured by the control variables we applied.  
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The direction of the coefficients estimated for most control variables in Regression 3 are 
consistent with previous studies or intuition. For instance, SOE is significantly positive and 
REFORM is significantly negative, which is broadly consistent with Hou and Lee (2006) and 
suggest that greater foreign share discount when there is greater conflict of interest between 
controlling and minority shareholders. RMV and RTO are both significantly positive, which 
suggests higher foreign share discount among firms where B-shares are associated with 
relatively greater information asymmetry (e.g. Chan et al., 2008) and illiquidity (Chen et al., 
20011). The coefficients are significantly positive for LEV, SALE, and BETA and significantly 
negative for IROA, which suggest higher foreign share discount for firms with more financial 
risk, growth, systematic risk exposure, and less profitable. 
[insert Table 3 here] 
Table 4 presents the regression analyses to test Hypothesis H2, which predicts that Chinese 
media coverage may have more association with foreign share discount than English media 
coverage.8 Under industry, year, region, and firm fixed effect control in Regression 1, the 
coefficient of CNEWS is significantly positive (0.0026, t-statistics = 3.23) while the coefficient 
of ENEWS is statistically insignificant. In Regressions 2 and 3 when other control variables are 
applied, the coefficient pertaining to CNEWS is consistently significantly positive while the 
coefficient of ENEWS is consistently insignificant. These findings provide robust evidence in 
support of the prediction of Hypothesis H2. It indicates that firms with greater Chinese media 
exposure are associated with incrementally higher A-share price than B-share price relative to 
firms with less Chinese media exposure. In contrast, cross-sectional variations in English media 
exposure have no association with cross-sectional variations in A- and B-share price 
differences. In other words, our evidence in support of hypothesis H1 is mainly attributed to 
Chinese media coverage instead of the English counterpart. 
[insert Table 4 here] 
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4.2 Test of H3 and H4 
Table 5 presents the test of Hypothesis H3, which predicts that evidence in support of 
Hypotheses H1 and H2 occurs mainly among firms with lower analyst following, reflected by a 
smaller number of financial analysts issuing reports on the listed firm. Indeed, the coefficient of 
RNEWS is significantly positive (0.0019, t-statistics = 2.03) among firms with less analyst 
following (Panel A) but statistically insignificant among firms with higher analyst following 
(Panel B). The coefficient of CNEWS is also significantly positive (0.0018, t-statistics = 2.00) 
only in Panel A and not in Panel B. In other words, Table 5 indicates that the empirical evidence 
in Tables 3 and 4 of the association between foreign share discount and Chinese media coverage 
mainly exist when more sophisticated information channel such as sell-side analystsare not 
available. This supports the prediction of Hypothesis H3.9. In untabulated robustness checks, 
we obtain consistent results by using the number of analyst reports as an alternative proxy for 
analyst following. 
[insert Table 5] 
Table 6 presents the test of Hypothesis H4, which predicts that evidence in support of 
Hypotheses H1 and H2 occurs mainly among firms with lower institutional fund ownership. As 
expected, the coefficient of RNEWS is significantly positive (0.0019, t-statistics = 2.29) among 
firms with less institutional fund ownership (Panel A) but statistically insignificant among 
firms with higher institutional ownership (Panel B). The coefficient of CNEWS is also 
significantly positive (0.0019, t-statistics = 2.26) only in Panel A and not in Panel B. Therefore, 
Table 6 indicates that the empirical evidence in Tables 3 and 4 of the association between 
foreign share discount and Chinese media coverage mainly exist when the security price are 
influenced more by unsophisticated individual investors than sophisticated institutional 
investors. This supports the prediction of Hypothesis H4.10 
[insert Table 6] 
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5. Conclusion 
The role of media in security pricing in the capital market is receiving increasing attention in 
the literature. The media is able to influence investors beyond conventional sources of 
information such as financial statements and analyst researches because it facilitates 
information dissemination and reduces information costs for the wider public. However, most 
studies in this area are limited to developed economies such as the US. As a result of 
institutional differences such as media independence and control, evidence from the US is 
difficult to be generalized to emerging countries. China is a high growth and increasingly 
influential transitional economy that is attracting increasing attention from academics, 
practitioners, and regulators. The foreign share discount puzzle of China is a well-document 
phenomenon that attracted the substantial interest in the literature over the past decade. Our 
study provides original evidence that intersects both topics. 
We provide four main findings. First, firms with relatively more Chinese than English 
language media coverage are associated with greater foreign share discount. This is consistent 
with domestic investors attaching lower discount rate and foreign investors attaching higher 
discount rate when firm coverage in local media outnumbers foreign media. Second, Chinese 
language media coverage dominate English language media coverage in terms of association 
with foreign share discount. This is consistent either with foreign investors being less reliant on 
media or with local business press being more timely and informative than foreign business 
press. Third, the two aforementioned effects are more pronounced among firms with less 
analyst coverage. This is consistent with investors being more reliant on media when more 
sophisticated and credible sources of information is not available. Finally, the influence of 
media on foreign share discount is more pronounced among firms with less institutional 
investors. This is consistent with less sophisticated individual investors being more dependent 
on media than more sophisticated institutional investors. 
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Our study has two main implications. First, despite widely held views in the western 
developed countries that Chinese media is politically influenced and tightly controlled, we 
confirm that it influences security pricing in the capital market. This implies that Chinese local 
media is still provides timely and informative perhaps for business news that are less sensitive 
politically. Second, media coverage is useful when there is limitation in alternative sources of 
information and especially to individual investors. In other words, media contributes to the 
capital market by narrowing the information gap between sophisticated and unsophisticated 
investors.11 
  
 21 
References 
Bae, K., R. Stulz, and H. Tan. 2008. Do local analysts know more? A cross-country study of the 
performance of local analysts and foreign analysts. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 
581–606. 
Bailey, W., Y. P. Chung, and J. Kang. 1999. Foreign ownership restrictions and equity price 
premiums: What drives the demand for cross-border investments? Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analyses 34, no. 4: 489–511. 
Barber, B., and T. Odean. 2008. All that glitters: The effect of attention and news on the buying 
behavior of individual and institutional investors. Review of Financial Studies 21, no. 2 
785-818. 
Besley, T. and A. Prat, 2006. Handcuffs for the grabbing hand? Media capture and government 
accountability.  American Economic Review 96, no. 3: 720-736. 
Brennan, M.J. and H. H. Cao. 1997. International portfolio investment flows. Journal of 
Finance 52, no. 5: 1851–1880. 
Bushee, B., J. Core, W. Guay, and S. Hamm. 2008. The role of business press as an information 
intermediary. Working paper, University of Pennsylvania. 
Chakravarty, S., A. Sarkar, and L. Wu. 1998.  Information asymmetry, market segmentation and 
the pricing of cross-listed shares: Theory and evidence from Chinese A and B shares. 
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 8 no. 3-4: 325–355. 
Chan, W. 2003. Stock price reaction to news and no-news: drift and reversal after headlines. 
Journal of Financial Economics 70, 223–260. 
Chan, K., A. J. Menkvled, and Z. Yang. 2008. Information asymmetry and asset prices: 
Evidence from China foreign share discount. Journal of Finance 63, no. 1: 159–196. 
Chen, G.M., B. Lee, and O. Rui. 2001. Foreign ownership restrictions and market segmentation 
in China’s stock markets. Journal of Financial Research 24, no. 1: 133–155. 
 22 
Da, Z., J. Engelberg, J., and P. Gao. 2012. In search of attention. Journal of Finance, 
forthcoming 
Diamond, D., and R. Verrecchia. 1991. Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. Journal of 
Finance 46, no. 4: 1325-59. 
Dyck, A., and L. Zingales. 2003, The media and asset prices, Working Paper, University of 
Chicago. 
Easley, D., and M. O’Hara. 2004. Information and the cost of capital. Journal of Finance 59, no. 4 
1553-83. 
Esarey, A. 2006. Speak no evil: Mass media control in contemporary China, Freedom House 
Special Report  
Fang, L., and J. Peress. 2009, Media coverage and the cross-section of stock returns. Journal of 
Finance 64, no. 5: 2023–52. 
Fernandes, N. and M. A. Ferreira. 2008. Does international cross-listing improve the 
information environment? Journal of Financial Economics 88, no. 2: 216-244. 
Fernald, J. and J. H. Rogers. 2002. Puzzles in the Chinese stock market. Review of Economics 
and Statistics 84, no. 3: 416–432. 
Frieder, L, and A. Subrahmanyam. 2005. Brand perceptions and the market for common stock. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 40, no. 1: 57-85. 
Froot, K.A. and T. Ramadorai, T. 2007. Institutional portfolio flows and international 
investments. Review of Financial Studies 21, no. 2: 937–971. 
Gong, S., and F. Gul. 2011. Chinese media coverage, divergence of opinion, and stock market 
outcomes. Working paper, Hong Kong Polytechnic University. 
Grinblatt, M. and M. Keloharju. 2001.  Distance, language, and culture bias: The role of 
investor sophistication. Journal of Finance 56, no. 3: 1053–1073. 
Grullon, G., G. Kanatas, and J. Weston. 2004. Advertising, breadth of ownership, and liquidity. 
Review of Financial Studies 17, no. 2: 439–461. 
 23 
Hou, W., and E. Lee. 2012. Split Share Structure Reform, corporate governance, and the foreign 
share discount puzzle in China. European Journal of Finance, forthcoming 
Llibanoff, P., O. Lamont, and T. Wizman. 1998. Investor reaction to salient news in closed-end 
country funds. Journal of Finance 53, no. 2: 673-99.  
Lombardo, D. and M. Pagano. 2002. Law and equity markets: a simple model. In: McCahery, 
Joseph A. (Ed.), Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity, Oxford 
University Press, London. 
Mei, J., J. A. Scheinkman, and W. Xiong, 2009. Speculative trading and stock prices: An 
analyses of Chinese A-B share premia. Annals of Economics and Finance 10, no. 2: 225–
255. 
Merton, R.C., 1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. 
Journal of Finance 42, no. 3: 483–510. 
Meschke, F. 2004. CEO interviews in CNBC, Working paper, Arizona State University. 
Stepanyan, G. (2011). Foreign Institutional Investors. Working paper. Catholic University of 
Portugal. 
Tan, V. 2011. Isolating the effect of disclosure on information risk. Journal of Accounting 
Economics 52, no.1: 81-99. 
Tetlock, P. 2007. Giving content to investor sentiment: The role of media in the stock market, 
Journal of Finance 62, no. 3: 1139-1168. 
Tetlock, P., M. Saar-Tsechansky, and S. Macskassy. 2008, More than words: Quantifying language 
to measure firms' fundamentals. Journal of Finance 63, no. 3: 1437-1467. 
Tong, W.H.S. and W. Yu. 2011. A corporate governance explanation of the A-B share discount 
in China. Journal of International Money and Finance 31, no. 2: 125-147 
  
 24 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
  Mean Stdev. Median 25% 75% Obs 
FSD 0.4366  0.1556  0.4513  0.3372  0.5536  4,218 
RNEWS 1.2674  2.1324  0.0000  0.0000  2.3026  4,218 
CNEWS 1.3876 2.1809 0 0 2.5649 4,218 
ENEWS 0.1201 0.3603 0 0 0 4,218 
SOE 0.7930  0.4052  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  4,218 
REFORM 0.4912  0.5000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  4,218 
RMV 1.1027  0.0894  1.0946  1.0311  1.1705  4,218 
RTO 1.3718  0.2565  1.3320  1.2031  1.4882  4,218 
RRET 0.9928  6.1070  0.8466  0.1859  1.5835  4,218 
LEV 0.5513  0.2722  0.5205  0.3864  0.6474  4,218 
SALE 0.2737  1.2348  0.1384  -0.0121  0.3137  4,218 
IROA 0.0002  0.0200  0.0014  -0.0043  0.0101  4,218 
TQ 0.6893  0.2431  0.7205  0.6228  0.7926  4,218 
BETA 1.1319  0.3394  1.1276  0.9315  1.3467  4,218 
PI -0.5561  1.9583  0.0156  -0.8495  0.4485  4,218 
OWNC 0.1736  0.1263  0.1295  0.0804  0.2594  4,218 
CHOLD 0.3046  0.4603  0 0 1 4,218 
CDUAL 0.0308  0.1729  0 0 0 4,218 
BINDP 0.1036  0.3048  0 0 0 4,218 
BMEET 0.5372  0.4987  1 0 1 4,218 
BSIZE 0.3480  0.4764  0 0 1 4,218 
       Analyst 5.2496 12.7051 0 0 5 4,218
Institutional ownership 0.0220 0.0544 0 0 0.0054 4,218 
       Note. This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analyses. The sample period covers
2004-2008 and includes A- and B-share dual-listing stocks appearing in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. FSDi,t is the monthly foreign share discount, calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided 
by the A-share price. SOE is 1 for state-controlled firms and 0 otherwise. REFORM 1 is 1 from the years in which the firm 
begins the process of the Split Share Structure Reform and all years afterward, and 0 for the years before this. RNEWSi,t is 
the natural logarithm of the ratio of monthly Chinese language news number to the English language news number. 
CNEWSi,t and ENEWSi,t are natural logarithm of the monthly number of Chinese language news reports and the number of 
English news reports respectively. RMV is the ratio of the market capitalization of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous 
month. RTO is the ratio of the turnover of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RRET is the ratio of the stock 
returns of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio of the last fiscal year. SALE is 
the percentage change in sales growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry median adjusted return on assets in the 
last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets. TQ is the Tobin’s Q for the last fiscal year, 
calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last 
year, estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the 
past one-year period. PI is the percentage change in share price informativeness over the last year, calculated as the log 
of [(1–R2)/R2] where R2 is based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese 
domestic and U.S. weekly market excess returns. OWNC is ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by 
the Herfindahl index, based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. CHOLD is equal to 1 for 
firms with CEO shareholdings above top 75th or below bottom 25th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. 
CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as the board chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 
for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 
otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms that held more board meetings in the last fiscal year than the cross-sectional median, and 
0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms whose board in the last fiscal year was larger than the cross-sectional median, and 0 
otherwise. Analyst following is the number of analysts issuing reports for the firm. Institutional ownership is the 
proportion of shares owed by mutual fund 
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Table 2. Correlation analyses 
  FSD RNEWS CNEWS ENEWS SOE REFORM RMV RTO RRET LEV SALE IROA TQ BETA PI OWNC CHOLD CDUAL BINDP BMEET BSIZE 
FSD 1.00                                        
RNEWS -0.16* 1.00                                      
CNEWS -0.20* 0.99* 1.00  
                 ENEWS -0.26* 0.05* 0.22* 1.00 
                 SOE 0.11* 0.01  0.05* 0.22* 1.00                                  
REFORM -0.33* 0.29* 0.01  0.02  -0.10* 1.00                                
RMV 0.26* 0.04  0.29* 0.29* 0.01  -0.12* 1.00                              
RTO 0.04* -0.06* 0.04  0.04  0.01  -0.01  0.02  1.00                            
RRET -0.06  0.01  -0.06* -0.05* -0.02  0.05* -0.02  0.01  1.00                          
LEV 0.05* -0.07* 0.01  0.01  -0.06* -0.02  0.04* -0.01  0.02  1.00                        
SALE 0.00  0.00  -0.07* -0.06* 0.01  0.01  -0.00  -0.03* -0.00  0.07* 1.00                      
IROA -0.26* 0.12* 0.00  0.00  -0.02  0.14* -0.19* -0.03  0.00  -0.50* 0.14* 1.00                    
TQ 0.12* -0.13* 0.12* 0.13* 0.10* -0.22* 0.04* 0.01  0.01  0.53* 0.00  -0.34* 1.00                  
BETA -0.03* -0.06* -0.13* -0.12* 0.01  0.05* -0.06* 0.12* 0.02  0.15* -0.07* -0.19* 0.05* 1.00                
PI -0.03  -0.05* -0.06* -0.07* 0.02  -0.09* 0.06* -0.05* -0.01  0.05* -0.00  -0.05* 0.06* -0.08* 1.00              
OWNC 0.19* -0.10* -0.05* -0.05* 0.19* -0.09* -0.03* -0.01  0.00  0.05* 0.01  -0.07* 0.20* 0.04* 0.05* 1.00            
CHOLD -0.17* 0.09* -0.10* -0.10* -0.11* 0.13* -0.11* 0.01  0.02  -0.08* -0.05* 0.15* -0.16* -0.05* -0.11* -0.38* 1.00          
CDUAL 0.02  -0.04  0.09* 0.10* -0.01  -0.01  -0.06* -0.00  0.00  0.02  0.01  -0.01  -0.03  0.07* 0.02  -0.07* 0.09* 1.00        
BINDP -0.09* -0.12* -0.04  -0.03  0.01  -0.13* -0.12* -0.01  0.01  0.12* 0.01  -0.03* 0.10* 0.06* 0.05* 0.01  -0.06* 0.01  1.00      
BMEET 0.05* -0.00  -0.12* -0.12* 0.05* -0.02  -0.05* 0.02  0.01  -0.05* -0.05* -0.01  0.01  -0.10* 0.03  0.01  0.08* -0.02  0.01  1.00    
BSIZE -0.04* -0.02  0.00  -0.01  0.05* -0.09* 0.02  -0.01  0.01  0.11* 0.00  0.01  0.12* -0.08* -0.02  -0.13* -0.02  -0.01  0.25* 0.02  1.00  
Note. This table presents the correlation analyses of the variables used in our analyses. The sample period covers 2004-2008 and includes A- and B-share dual-listing stocks appearing in both the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. FSDi,t is the monthly foreign share discount, calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. RNEWSi,t is the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of monthly Chinese language news number to the English language news number. CNEWSi,t and ENEWSi,t are the natural logarithm of the monthly number of Chinese language 
news reports and the number of English news reports respectively. SOE is 1 for state-controlled firms and 0 otherwise. REFORM 1 is 1 from the years in which the firm begins the process of the Split 
Share Structure Reform and all years afterward, and 0 for the years before this. RMV is the ratio of the market capitalization of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the ratio of the 
turnover of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RRET is the ratio of the stock returns of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio of the last fiscal year. 
SALE is the percentage change in sales growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry median adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets. 
TQ is the Tobin’s Q for the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, estimated from time-series 
regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the past one-year period. PI is the percentage change in share price informativeness over the last year, calculated as 
the log of [(1–R2)/R2] where R2 is based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess returns. OWNC is ownership 
concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by the Herfindahl index, based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. CHOLD is equal to 1 for firms with CEO shareholdings 
above top 75th or below bottom 25th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as the board chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. BINDP 
is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms that held more board meetings in the last fiscal 
year than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms whose board in the last fiscal year was larger than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 3. Test of hypothesis H1: Chinese to English language media coverage ratio 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
RNEWS 0.0026 (3.22) 
*** 0.0020 (2.52) ** 0.0019 (2.56) ** 
SOE     
  0.0388 (5.27) *** 0.0346 (5.17) *** 
REFORM     
  
-0.0386 (-10.36) *** -0.1096 (-17.20) *** 
RMV     
  0.6074 (8.71) *** 0.4749 (6.91) *** 
RTO     
  0.0921 (13.11) *** 0.0739 (11.13) *** 
RRET     
  0.0003 (1.19) 
 
0.0001 (0.51) 
 
LEV     
  0.1264 (5.47) *** 0.0695 (3.17) *** 
SALE     
  0.0052 (3.48) *** 0.0037 (2.72) *** 
IROA     
  
-0.3776 (-3.32) *** -0.4184 (-4.01) *** 
TQ     
  
-0.0399 (-4.54) *** -0.0001 (-0.01) 
 
BETA     
  
-0.0075 (-1.36) 
 
0.0295 (5.53) *** 
PI     
  
-0.0064 (-7.50) *** -0.0005 (-0.57) 
 
OWNC     
  0.0697 (1.86) * 0.1347 (3.94) *** 
CHOLD     
  
-0.0177 (-2.42) ** -0.0134 (-2.02) ** 
CDUAL     
  
-0.0305 (-2.37) ** -0.0144 (-1.22) 
 
BINDP     
  0.0148 (2.03) ** 0.0141 (2.06) ** 
BMEET     
  
-0.0107 (-2.70) *** -0.0029 (-0.80) 
 
BSIZE     
  
-0.0291 (-4.56) *** -0.0114 (-1.95) * 
Constant 0.4633 (89.07) *** -0.4042 (-5.12) *** -0.1589 (-1.99) ** 
   
 
  
 
  
 
Industry effect   Yes     No     Yes   
Year effect   Yes     No     Yes   
Region effect   Yes     No     Yes   
Firm fixed effect   Yes     Yes     Yes   
R2   0.0345     0.0327     0.113   
Obs.   4,218     4,218     4,218   
   
 
     
 
Note. This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analyses. The sample period covers 2004-2008 and includes 
A- and B-share dual-listing stocks appearing in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. FSDi,t is the monthly foreign share 
discount, calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. RNEWSi,t is the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of monthly Chinese language news number to the English language news number. SOE is 1 for state-controlled firms and 0 
otherwise. REFORM 1 is 1 from the years in which the firm begins the process of the Split Share Structure Reform and all years 
afterward, and 0 for the years before this. RMV is the ratio of the market capitalization of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. 
RTO is the ratio of the turnover of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RRET is the ratio of the stock returns of A- to 
B-shares at the end of the previous month. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio of the last fiscal year. SALE is the percentage change in sales 
growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry median adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating 
income divided by total assets. TQ is the Tobin’s Q for the last fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by 
total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess 
returns on daily market excess returns over the past one-year period. PI is the percentage change in share price informativeness over 
the last year, calculated as the log of [(1–R2)/R2] where R2 is based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on 
both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess returns. OWNC is ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by the 
Herfindahl index, based on the ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. CHOLD is equal to 1 for firms with CEO 
shareholdings above top 75th or below bottom 25th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO 
also served as the board chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors 
in the last fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms that held more board meetings in the 
last fiscal year than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms whose board in the last fiscal year was larger than 
the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4. Test of hypothesis H2: Chinese vs English language media coverage 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
CNEWS 0.0026  (3.23) *** 0.0021  (2.53) ** 0.0020  (2.59) ** 
ENEWS -0.0006  (-0.10) 
 
-0.0010  (-0.17) 
 
0.0011  (0.21) 
 
SOE 
  
 
0.0388  (5.27) ***
 
0.0347  (5.19) 
*** 
REFORM 
  
 
-0.0386  (-10.36) ***
 
-0.1096  (-17.2) 
*** 
RMV 
  
 
0.6076  (8.71) ***
 
0.4761  (6.93) 
*** 
RTO 
  
 
0.0921  (13.11) ***
 
0.0739  (11.13) 
*** 
RRET 
  
 
0.0003  (1.19) 
 
0.0001  (0.51) 
 
LEV 
  
 
0.1264  (5.46) ***
 
0.0693  (3.16) 
*** 
SALE 
  
 
0.0052  (3.48) ***
 
0.0037  (2.71) 
*** 
IROA 
  
 
-0.3774  (-3.32) ***
 
-0.4177  (-4.01) ***
 
TQ 
  
 
-0.0400  (-4.54) ***
 
0.0000  (-0.01) 
 
BETA 
  
 
-0.0075  (-1.36) 
 
0.0295  (5.52) ***
 
PI 
  
 
-0.0064  (-7.51) ***
 
-0.0005  (-0.59) 
 
OWNC 
  
 
0.0695  (1.85) *
 
0.1341  (3.92) ***
 
CHOLD 
  
 
-0.0178  (-2.43) **
 
-0.0136  (-2.03) **
 
CDUAL 
  
 
-0.0305  (-2.37) ** -0.0144  (-1.22) 
 
BINDP 
  
 
0.0148  (2.03) ** 0.0141  (2.06) ** 
BMEET 
  
 
-0.0108  (-2.70) *** -0.0029  (-0.81) 
 
BSIZE 
  
 
-0.0291  (-4.56) *** -0.0115  (-1.95) * 
Constant 0.4631  (88.20) *** -0.4044  (-5.13) *** -0.1605  (-2.01) ** 
   
 
  
 
  
 
Industry effect   Yes     No     Yes   
Year effect   Yes     No     Yes   
Region effect   Yes     No     Yes   
Firm fixed effect   Yes     Yes     Yes   
R2   0.0334 
 
 
0.0322 
 
 
0.1105   
Obs.   4,218     4,218     4,218   
   
 
     
 
Note. This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analyses. The sample period covers 2004-2008 and 
includes A- and B-share dual-listing stocks appearing in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. FSDi,t is the monthly 
foreign share discount, calculated as the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. CNEWSi,t and 
ENEWSi,t are the monthly number of Chinese language news reports and the number of English news reports respectively. SOE is 
1 for state-controlled firms and 0 otherwise. REFORM 1 is 1 from the years in which the firm begins the process of the Split Share 
Structure Reform and all years afterward, and 0 for the years before this. RMV is the ratio of the market capitalization of A- to 
B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the ratio of the turnover of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. 
RRET is the ratio of the stock returns of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio of the last 
fiscal year. SALE is the percentage change in sales growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry median adjusted return 
on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets. TQ is the Tobin’s Q for the last fiscal year, 
calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, 
estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the past one-year 
period. PI is the percentage change in share price informativeness over the last year, calculated as the log of [(1–R2)/R2] where 
R2 is based on a time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market 
excess returns. OWNC is ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by the Herfindahl index, based on the 
ownership held by the ten largest shareholders in the firm. CHOLD is equal to 1 for firms with CEO shareholdings above top 75th 
or below bottom 25th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as the 
board chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last 
fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms that held more board meetings in the last 
fiscal year than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms whose board in the last fiscal year was larger 
than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5. Test of hypothesis H3: High vs low analyst following 
 
Panel A: Low analyst following Panel B: High analyst following 
RNEWS 0.0019 (2.03) ** 
  
 
0.0002 (0.18) 
 
  
 
CNEWS 
  
 
0.0018  (2.00) ** 
  
 
0.0002  (0.20) 
 
ENEWS 
  
 
-0.0080  (-0.95) 
   
 
0.0005  (0.09) 
 
SOE 0.0207 (2.75) *** 0.0204  (2.70) 
*** 
0.0008 (0.07) 
 
0.0008  (0.07) 
 
REFORM -0.1256 (-17.4) *** -0.1255  (-17.39) 
*** 
-0.0288 (-2.50) ** -0.0287  (-2.50) **
 
RMV 0.4680 (5.21) *** 0.4697  (5.23) 
*** 
0.3768 (3.33) *** 0.3778  (3.33) ***
 
RTO 0.0925 (12.19) *** 0.0925  (12.17) 
*** 
0.0132 (1.11) 
 
0.0132  (1.11) 
 
RRET 0.0000 (0.14) 
 
0.0000  (0.14) 
 
0.0003 (1.01) 
 
0.0003  (1.01) 
 
LEV 0.0312 (1.30) 
 
0.0310  (1.30) 
 
0.1125 (2.17) ** 0.1121  (2.16) **
 
SALE 0.0056 (4.29) *** 0.0056  (4.290 
*** 
0.0102 (2.56) ** 0.0102  (2.56) **
 
IROA -0.4046 (-4.04) *** -0.4042  (-4.03) 
*** 
-1.7318 (-5.57) *** -1.7314  (-5.57) ***
 
TQ -0.0117 (-1.37) 
 
-0.0117  (-1.36) 
 
0.0015 (0.07) 
 
0.0015  (0.08) 
 
BETA -0.0004 (-0.06) 
 
-0.0004  (-0.06) 
 
0.0443 (4.37) *** 0.0442  (4.36) ***
 
PI 0.0000 (0.03) 
 
0.0001  (0.06) 
 
0.0022 (1.63) 
 
0.0022  (1.63) 
 
OWNC 0.1486 (3.99) *** 0.1486  (3.99) ***
 
0.1263 (2.00) ** 0.1258  (1.99) **
 
CHOLD 0.0163 (1.74) * 0.0164  (1.75) * -0.0172 (-1.58) 
 
-0.0172  (-1.58) 
 
CDUAL -0.0602 (-2.07) ** -0.0600  (-2.06) ** 0.0129 (0.98) 
 
0.0129  (0.98) 
 
BINDP 0.0016 (0.21) 
 
0.0017  (0.21) 
 
0.0734 (4.95) *** 0.0733  (4.93) 
*** 
BMEET -0.0008 (-0.18) 
 
-0.0009  (-0.18) 
 
-0.0281 (-4.99) *** -0.0281  (-4.99) 
*** 
BSIZE -0.0111 (-1.57) 
 
-0.0109  (-1.54) 
 
-0.0874 (-8.63) *** -0.0873  (-8.61) 
*** 
Constant -0.1557 (-1.52) 
 
-0.1570  (-1.53) 
 
0.0114 (0.09) 
 
-0.0889  (-0.72) 
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
   Industry effect   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes 
 Year effect   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes 
 Region effect   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes 
 Firm fixed effect   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes 
 R2   0.02   
 
0.0215     0.2172   
 
0.2165 
 Obs.   2,489   
 
2,489     1,729   
 
1729 
 Note. This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analyses. The sample period covers 2004-2008 and includes A- 
and B-share dual-listing stocks appearing in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. We partition the sample by median value of 
analyst following, which is the number of analysts issuing reports for the firm. FSDi,t is the monthly foreign share discount, calculated as the 
A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. RNEWSi,t is the natural logarithm of the ratio of monthly Chinese 
language news number to the English language news number. CNEWSi,t and ENEWSi,t are the monthly number of Chinese language news 
reports and the number of English news reports respectively. SOE is 1 for state-controlled firms and 0 otherwise. REFORM 1 is 1 from the 
years in which the firm begins the process of the Split Share Structure Reform and all years afterward, and 0 for the years before this. RMV 
is the ratio of the market capitalization of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the ratio of the turnover of A- to B-shares 
at the end of the previous month. RRET is the ratio of the stock returns of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. LEV is the 
debt-to-equity ratio of the last fiscal year. SALE is the percentage change in sales growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry 
median adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets. TQ is the Tobin’s Q for the last 
fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, 
estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the past one-year period. 
PI is the percentage change in share price informativeness over the last year, calculated as the log of [(1–R2)/R2] where R2 is based on a 
time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess returns. OWNC is 
ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by the Herfindahl index, based on the ownership held by the ten largest 
shareholders in the firm. CHOLD is equal to 1 for firms with CEO shareholdings above top 75th or below bottom 25th percentile of yearly 
cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as the board chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
BINDP is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 
otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms that held more board meetings in the last fiscal year than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. 
BSIZE is 1 for firms whose board in the last fiscal year was larger than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 6. Test of hypothesis H4: High vs low institutional ownership 
 
Panel A: Low institutional ownership Panel B: High institutional ownership 
RNEWS 0.0019 (2.29) ** 
  
 
0.0010 (0.85) 
 
  
 
CNEWS 
  
 
0.0019 (2.26) ** 
  
 
0.0010 (0.89) 
 
ENEWS 
  
 
-0.0088 (-1.03) 
   
 
0.0015 (0.26) 
 
SOE 0.0171 (2.16) ** 0.0169 (2.13) 
** 
0.0142 (1.26) 
 
0.0143 (1.27) 
REFORM -0.1281 (-18.19) *** -0.1281 (-18.18) 
*** 
-0.0602 (-5.5) *** -0.0601 (-5.5) 
*** 
RMV 0.6205 (7.03) *** 0.6226 (7.05) 
*** 
0.4009 (3.67) *** 0.4048  (3.69) 
*** 
RTO 0.0929 (11.57) *** 0.0927 (11.54) 
*** 
0.0168 (1.79) * 0.0168 (1.79) 
* 
RRET -0.0001 (-0.55) 
 
-0.0001 (-0.55) 
 
0.0004 (1.41) 
 
0.0004 (1.42) 
 
LEV 0.0586 (2.52) ** 0.0584 (2.51) **
 
0.1044 (2.14) ** 0.1030 (2.11) 
** 
SALE 0.0065 (5.05) *** 0.0065 (5.04) 
*** 
0.0012 (0.29) 
 
0.0011 (0.28) 
 
IROA -0.4824 (-4.28) *** -0.4815 (-4.27) 
*** 
-1.3188 (-6.18) *** -1.3174 (-6.17) ***
 
TQ -0.0085 (-1.04) 
 
-0.0084 (-1.03) 
 
-0.0553 (-2.59) ** -0.0551 (-2.58) **
 
BETA -0.0199 (-3.22) *** -0.0198 (-3.22) ***
 
0.0240 (2.32) ** 0.0239 (2.31) **
 
PI -0.0014 (-1) 
 
-0.0014 (-0.99) 
 
0.0007 (0.72) 
 
0.0007 (0.7) 
 
OWNC 0.0526 (1.22) 
 
0.0525 (1.22) 
 
-0.0408 (-0.74) 
 
-0.0417 (-0.76) 
 
CHOLD 0.0360 (3.52) *** 0.0360 (3.52) 
*** 
0.0070 (0.7) 
 
0.0070 (0. 7) 
 
CDUAL -0.0745 (-2.56) ** -0.0741 (-2.55) **
 
-0.0002 (-0.01) 
 
-0.0001 (0) 
 
BINDP 0.0264 (3.19) *** 0.0264 (3.19) 
*** 
0.0149 (1.41) 
 
0.0149 (1.4) 
 
BMEET -0.0044 (-0.98) 
 
-0.0045 (-0.99) 
 
-0.0099 (-1.81) * -0.0101 (-1.83) *
 
BSIZE -0.0373 (-4.85) *** -0.0371 (-4.81) ***
 
-0.0391 (-4.55) *** -0.0390 (-4.55) ***
 
Constant -0.2226 (-2.15) ** -0.2267 (-2.2) 
** 
-0.0233 (-0.19) 
 
-0.0275 (-0.23) 
 
   
 
  
 
      Industry effect   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes 
 Year effect   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes 
 Region effect   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes 
 Firm fixed effect   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes 
  R2   0.0509   
 
0.0493     0.087   
 
0.0842 
 Obs.   2,468   
 
2,468     1,750   
 
1,750 
 Note. This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analyses. The sample period covers 2004-2008 and includes A- 
and B-share dual-listing stocks appearing in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. We partition the sample by median value of 
institutional ownership, which is the proportion of shares owned by mutual fund. FSDi,t is the monthly foreign share discount, calculated as 
the A-share price minus the B-share price, divided by the A-share price. RNEWSi,t is the natural logarithm of the ratio of monthly Chinese 
language news number to the English language news number. CNEWSi,t and ENEWSi,t are the monthly number of Chinese language news 
reports and the number of English news reports respectively. SOE is 1 for state-controlled firms and 0 otherwise. REFORM 1 is 1 from the 
years in which the firm begins the process of the Split Share Structure Reform and all years afterward, and 0 for the years before this. RMV 
is the ratio of the market capitalization of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. RTO is the ratio of the turnover of A- to B-shares 
at the end of the previous month. RRET is the ratio of the stock returns of A- to B-shares at the end of the previous month. LEV is the 
debt-to-equity ratio of the last fiscal year. SALE is the percentage change in sales growth over the last fiscal year. IROA is the industry 
median adjusted return on assets in the last fiscal year, calculated as operating income divided by total assets. TQ is the Tobin’s Q for the last 
fiscal year, calculated as the sum of market value and debt, divided by total equity. BETA is the CAPM beta up to the end of the last year, 
estimated from time-series regressions of firm-specific daily excess returns on daily market excess returns over the past one-year period. 
PI is the percentage change in share price informativeness over the last year, calculated as the log of [(1–R2)/R2] where R2 is based on a 
time-series regression of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese domestic and U.S. weekly market excess returns. OWNC is 
ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, measured by the Herfindahl index, based on the ownership held by the ten largest 
shareholders in the firm. CHOLD is equal to 1 for firms with CEO shareholdings above top 75th or below bottom 25th percentile of yearly 
cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms whose CEO also served as the board chairman in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
BINDP is 1 for firms whose proportion of independent directors in the last fiscal year was above the cross-sectional median, and 0 
otherwise. BMEET is 1 for firms that held more board meetings in the last fiscal year than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. 
BSIZE is 1 for firms whose board in the last fiscal year was larger than the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. 
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1 See details at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a_84o9PPPGqk.  
2 In our study, the foreign share discount is measured at the last trading day of each months and the media coverage 
measure is based the number of news throughout the entire time period of the corresponding months. Thus, except 
for news released exactly at the last trading day of the month, our media coverage measure mainly captures news 
released before the day that the foreign share discount is measured. 
3 This influential newspaper was not started until late 2004. In untabulated robust checks, we obtain consistent 
results after excluding this newspaper from our sample or including this newspaper but postpone the sample 
starting period from 2004 to 2005.  
4 Hou and Lee (2012) document that the Split Share Structure Reform that began from 2005 onward in China has 
significant impact on the foreign share discount among state-controlled listed firms. This reform allows restricted 
shares to become tradable in the stock market and Chinese firm initiate the process in batches at different times as 
selected by the regulatory commission. 
5 Chinese domestic market returns are based on the Shanghai Composite Index. Chinese risk-free rates are based 
on the 7-day interbank rate. U.S. stock market returns are based on a NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ 
value-weighted portfolio. U.S. risk-free rates are based on the one-month Treasury bill. The data are respectively 
from CCER (China Centre for Economic Research) and Compustat listed in WRDS (Wharton Research Data 
Services) 
6 We also replicate our tests on a booming periods, i.e. 2005-2007 and acquired inferences consistent to our main 
findings. 
7 The China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) is a research database established by Tsinghua University 
of China and it contains articles academic journals, conference proceeds, newspaper articles. For more information 
please see http://eng.cnki.net/grid2008/index.htm 
8 Chakravarty et al. (1998) provide evidence the English media affects Chinese foreign share discount based on an 
earlier sample period of 1994 to 1998. The difference of their results from our findings in Table 5 is likely to be due 
to the difference in sample period. One possible reason for this is the significant growth of foreign institutional 
ownership in emerging economies (e.g. Stepanyan, 2011) such as China. Institutional investors are more 
sophisticated and less dependent on media for information than individual investors.  Thus, as foreign institutional 
investors increase for Chinese firms through time, there would be a decrease in the effect of English media on 
foreign share discount. 
9 Using the full sample, we also carried out further regression analyses that include a low analyst following dummy 
variable (equivalent to 1 for firms with below median analyst following and 0 otherwise) as well as the interaction 
term of this dummy variable with RNEWS in Equation 1 or CNEWS and ENEWS in Equation 2. These results 
confirm that the relationships between foreign share discount and total news or Chinese news coverage are 
significantly more pronounced among the low analyst following group. For brevity we do not tabulate these 
findings. 
10 Using the full sample, we also carried out further regression analyses that include a low institutional ownership  
dummy variable (equivalent to 1 for firms with below median institutional ownership and 0 otherwise) as well as 
the interaction term of this dummy variable with RNEWS in Equation 1 or CNEWS and ENEWS in Equation 2. 
These results confirm that the relationships between foreign share discount and total news or Chinese news 
coverage are significantly more pronounced among the low institutional ownership group. For brevity we do not 
tabulate these findings. 
11 Of course, as Da et al (2012) argues, media coverage is considered as a passive attention measure in that it is not 
possible to guarantee that investors will read the articles that appear in newspapers. 
